

OFFICIAL PRESS ROOM BULLETINS		
Garry Kasparov vs. Nigel Short	PRESS ROOM  The Times World Chess Championship	Savoy Theater London, England 1993
Edited by Eric Schiller		

At each of the World Chess Championships in which I was involved as Press Officer, the media center produced a quick post-game bulletin for use by the press. Later, a carefully prepared analysis was presented in the official daily bulletins. The press bulletins contain initial impressions and quick analysis and research with the help of such computer software as was available at the time.

In 1993, the press center was located in the famous Morphy hangout: Simpson's-in-the-Strand, located right next to the Savoy Theater. Many Grandmasters and top stars were present, and our staff managed to obtain many interesting quotes and comments, which were incorporated into the press bulletins.

Please keep in mind, that these opinions were offered during the game, without the benefit of computer aids. We tried to capture the essence of the analysis going on in the press room and analysis room. The notes and quotations offer a remarkable insight into the thinking of professional players, but were never intended as serious analysis. I hope you enjoy reading them in this 10th Anniversary collection. I've tried to keep the originals intact, but have added diagrams and made formatting and spelling changes as needed. No analysis has been changed in any way.

Thanks to Ray Keene, organizer of the match, for granting permission to make these documents available to the public. Thanks, to to all the staff members who helped gather material, including Lewis "The Skipper" Shipman, ML Rantala and many others. And above all, thanks to the Grandmasters and other players who shared their thoughts with us!


Eric Schiller
Moss Beach, California
June, 2003

<p>PRESS ROOM</p>  <p>The Times World Chess Championship</p>	<p>GAME 1 9 September 1993</p> <p>Kasparov vs. Short Spanish Game Anti-Marshall Variation [C88]</p> <p>Commentator: Patrick Wolff</p>
---	--

1.e4. A slight surprise though predicted by some Grandmasters. **1...e5 2.Nf3 Nc6 3.Bb5 a6 4.Ba4 Nf6 5.0-0 Be7 6.Re1 b5 7.Bb3 0-0.** A very interesting ploy. This move threatens the Marshall attack, though black still has a choice on whether or not to play it. The onus is on White to either take on the attack or try one of the anti-Marshall ploys. Kasparov took the latter. **8.a4.** This move shows Kasparov's typical flexibility in his opening preparation. It is commonly thought among Grandmasters that this line does not offer White any appreciable chance for advantage. However, Kasparov has obviously thought more deeply about his chances in these lines. **8... b4.** The normal move in this position is to play 8...Bb7. Most practitioners of this line do not trust pushing this pawn so early as it weakens the b-pawn even further. Still, the main line move, 8...Bb7, has its drawbacks as well, chiefly that the bishop might be badly placed on that diagonal where it hits the e-pawn which will be solidly defended by the d-pawn on d3. In fact Nigel himself has played Bb7 himself and easily held the Indian Grandmaster Anand.

Anand vs. Short, Amsterdam: 1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nc6 3.Bb5 a6 4.Ba4 Nf6 5.0-0 Be7 6.Re1 b5 7.Bb3 0-0 8.a4 Bb7 9.d3 d6 10.Nc3 Na5 11.Ba2 b4 12.Ne2 Rb8 13.Ng3 c5 14.Nf5 Bc8 15.Ne3 Be6. Neutralising the a2-g8 diagonal, with a similar theme to Kasparov-Short. Now however, if 16.Nd5 black seizes the initiative with 16...b3!. 16.Bd2 Ne8 17.Bxe6 fxe6 18.c3 Nc6 19.Nc4 Nc7 20.Be3 Bf6 21.Rc1 bxc3 22.bxc3 d5. And black has secured a fair share of the centre. Drawn in 55 moves.

9.d3.



I am not personally familiar with this position, so I cannot say what the theory is here. I vaguely remember seeing 9.d4, at which point play might continue 9...d6 10.dxe5 Nxe5! 11.Nxe5 dxe5 and Black seems to be okay. A second critical continuation is 9.a5, the idea of which is to prevent the resource 9...Na5 mentioned below. Unfortunately, I do not presently have access to the theoretical materials which I would need to accurately assess this idea, but perhaps 9...d5 10.exd5 Nxd5 is possible, with play similar to the main lines of the Marshall Gambit. **9...d6** (?!).


**“I would have preferred to play 9...Na5 to prevent White’s next move. Black should sac the pawn and go for it”
—Hodgson.**

The former English champion might have had the following variation in mind: 9...Na5 10.Nxe5 (10.Ba2 b3!? 11.cxb3 Nc6 gives some compensation in the form of Black’s active piece play and White’s shattered pawns to make up for the lost b-pawn.) 10...Nxb3 11.cxb3 Bb7 and next move Black tries to blast open the center for the light-squared bishop with ...d7-d5.

“9...d6 is a good move since Kasparov must have prepared against .Na5.” —Dlugy.

I should add to this that after 9...Na5 10.Ba2 b3 11.Bxb3!? might be stronger. Then 11...Nxb3 12.cxb3 d6 13.d4 gives White some chances for advantage with his extra pawn.

10.a5!



“After this move White is always structurally better because of the weak b-pawn.” — Hodgson.

10.c3 was played in Divis-Pachman, Czech Championship, 1993, but Kasparov chooses a completely different plan. **10...Be6**. At first the Grandmasters wanted to put this bishop on g4, but after 11.Be3, the bishop seemed to be misplaced. **11.Nbd2**.

“Taking on e6 is not so good because it opens the f-file for the rook” —Charu, of the Harlem (New York) Raging Rooks chess team..


11...Rb8. This is a sensible move, but it is apparently also a novelty. Former World Champion Vassily Smyslov played this position as Black against British former Candidate GM Jon Speelman, and he played 11...Bxb3 12.Nxb3 d5, although after 13.Qe2, White kept some advantage. **12.Bc4!** Not one Grandmaster who was looking at this position in the analysis room anticipated this move, but with hindsight it looks quite good. Kasparov hits the a-pawn thereby gaining a tempo, and meanwhile improves the position of the bishop. Now if Black takes on c4, the knight can recapture on a much stronger square than b3, and meanwhile the bishop is defended by the d-pawn as well. **12...Qc8**.



13.Nf1!? This move was also missed in the Grandmaster Room, and yet again it is quite good. Kasparov realizes that Black does not want to take on c4 as this would strengthen White's grip on the center, and therefore simply maneuvers the knight to a better square on e3 via f1. The Grandmasters considered mainly two other moves:

a) 13.b3! was the bulletin editor's suggestion, though not well liked in general. The idea is to play Bb2 and d3-d4. It is not clear how Black should play, but critical would be 12...d5 13.exd5 Nxd5 14.Bb2


b) 13.c3! was also possible, and favored by the other Grandmasters in the analysis room. White intends to play Qa4 and perhaps d4 at some time. Again, this is food for further thought, and it is not clear how Black should play. **13...Re8 (31) 14.Ne3 (55)** Speelman suggested that 14.Bg5! was a possible alternative.



14...Nd4? This move was criticized by Kasparov after the game. Still, it is difficult to find an obvious continuation for Black. Perhaps Black could play 14...Bf8 with the idea of 15...g6 and 16...Bg7. GM Julian Hodgson pointed out that it is difficult for Black to move the QN and play ...c5 (which would be very desirable for Black to do), because after 14...Nd8?, 15.d4! is strong. **15.Nxd4 exd4 16.Nd5!**

“The only try for an advantage.” —Petursson.

The Grandmasters also looked at 16.Bxe6 Qxe6 (16...fxe6 17.Nc4 e5 18.f4! is good for White) 17.Nc4 (17.Nf5 c5! should be fine for Black, as he already threatens 18...b3, and White does not have enough development to support the knight on f5.) 17...Nd7 18.Bf4 Rb5!?! with the idea of ...Bg5 seems okay for Black.



While Short was thinking, the Grandmasters came to the following conclusions:

- a) 16...Bd8 17.Bf4! is strong, putting pressure on d6 and so preventing Black from easily playing ...c6.
- b) 16...Nxd5 17.exd5 Bd7 18 .Bf4 with the idea of Qd2 is pleasant for White, because Black's pawn on d4 is hideously weak.
- c) 16...Bxd5 looks funny at first, because usually Black would want to keep the bishop, but it takes precise play by White to prove an advantage: 17.exd5 Nd7 18.Qg4! Bf6 19.Bg5! and the pawn on d4 is terribly weak again. Short thought for more than half an hour on this move, and after the game he admitted that he had not accurately calculated the tactics of this continuation.


16...Nxd5 17.exd5. Now that the position had actually arisen, the Grandmasters wanted to find better moves for White. We became engrossed in the murky complications of

18.Bd2 (18.Qf3? Bg4! [Hennigan] 19.Qf4 Bg5! +, or 19.Qe4 Qd7! and White is awkwardly placed.) 18...Qf5 19.Re4 Bf6 20.Rxe8 Bxe8 21.Qe1 c5!? 22.dxc6 Bxc6. **17...Bd7 18.Bd2 Bf6.**



19.Rxe8+ Bxe8. Also possible was 19...Qxe8, since 20.Bxa6 Bb5! wins back the pawn. White could continue with 21.Qf3 Bb5 22.Re1 Qd7, but perhaps this is a slight improvement over the game since White loses a tempo if he wants to play Qe2 here. Of course the normal 23.b3 maintains some advantage.

20.Qe2! Bb5 21.Re1 Bxc4 22.dxc4 h6!? Short used a lot of time to play the last couple of moves, but it is clear that he is defending a bad position very well. Black could not play 22...b3? here, as after 23.cxb3 White is a clear pawn up, 23...Rxb3?? losing to 24.Qe8+ and mates. This induces Kasparov to “physically” prevent the b-pawn from advancing, but this allows Short to get in the critical ...c5 move. All the while, however, the clock was ticking... **23.b3**




23...c5! At this point Kasparov started thinking, which is in itself quite surprising because the “normal” move here is 24.dxc6. It must be that Garry was not satisfied with the position which would then arise, and indeed as we looked further at the position it appeared that Short may have seen further than the rest of us, e.g. 24.dxc6 Qxc6 25.Qh5 (25.Qf3!? Qc5! [25...Qxf3 26.gxf3 is a good endgame for White] 26.Bxh6 Qxa5 and Black has active play.) 25...Qc5! and it is not clear how White makes progress. The problem is that White’s a-pawn is weak as well in all lines.

However, Short might also have considered 23...c6. This has the advantage that White cannot ignore the movement of the c-pawn as in fact Kasparov chose to do, since Black is threatening to take on d5. Possible continuations for White would then be:

- a) 24.dxc6 Qxc6 transposes to the analysis in the above paragraph.
- b) 24.Qe4 cxd5 25.Qxd5 Qc5 and now:
 - i) 26.Qxc5 dxc5 27.Bf4 Rd8 and the threat of ...d3 gives Black good counterplay.
 - ii) 26.Bf4 Qxd5 27.cxd5 Rb5! 28.Bxd6 Rxa5 and Black has no problems.
- c) 24.Qd3 cxd5 25.cxd5 Rb5! and again Black seems fine here.
- d) 24.Bf4! (this seems like White’s best try) 24...Qc7 (24...cxd5 25.Bxd6 with an enormous advantage for White) 25.Qe4 and White maintains some pressure.

24.Bf4. Kasparov made this move and then held his head in his hands, a sure sign that he was not happy with himself. Nevertheless, White still maintains a pull due to his more active pieces. **24...Qd7.** This was expected by the Grandmasters, so as to maintain some control over the light squares. **25.h3 Rd8.** Nigel had only nine minutes left to make fifteen moves when he played this. **26.Qe4.**



“It’s going to be a time scramble, it’s going to be very exciting!” Hodgson exclaimed when this move was made.

And indeed, each player had only eight minutes to reach move forty. Plaskett now insisted that 26...h5 be played, with the idea of putting as many pawns as possible on


light squares. **26. ...h5**. Many Grandmasters now thought that Black should hold the draw.

“With only one weakness, Black may be able to draw,” —Dlugy.

Nevertheless, what we failed to understand at the moment was that the extended kingside is the second weakness that it is always said is necessary to lose a static position. Plus of course, each player had but six minutes to reach move forty. Nigel might have done better to refrain from this move while the queens were on. **27.Re2 g6**.

“Both players are just playing moves to make move before the time control,” —Dlugy.

But the critical difference is that Short had to accurately weigh the consequences of each new weakness he created, while Kasparov could afford to simply putter around and wait. White’s 27th move looks at first as though it has no point, but its point may be to defend the c-pawn in anticipation of a possible queen hunt for the a-pawn which would bring it into the White camp. And one of Short’s ideas may have been to cover the f5 square preventing the following variation: **27...Qc7 28.Qf5 Qxa5 29.Bxd6**, or **28...h4 29.Bg5. 28.Qf3! Bg7 29.Re4!** Hodgson realized that this was to prepare **30.Qe2**, and suddenly it seemed that White may have something again.



29...Bf8 30.Qe2. All according to plan, and the prospect of a coming g2-g4 looked quite scary. **30...Qc7**. The consensus was that both **31.g4** and **31.Re8** look dangerous for Black.


“I didn’t like 30...Qc7, and you can quote me on that!” offered Hodgson.

The problem is that Black lacks an active plan if not this move, but going after the a-pawn certainly looks too risky for Black. **31.Bg5**. This was a third move suggested by Plaskett, which also looked good. Perhaps Kasparov simply didn’t have time to work out concretely which move was best, but we can at least look at the other two moves a little:

a) 31.Re8 has the point that 31...Rxe8 32.Qxe8 Qe7 33.Qc8! is very strong for White. However, 31...Qd7! just forces White to go back with the rook, since it is certainly not to White's advantage to trade rooks if he does not in the process penetrate with the queen to the eighth rank.

b) 31.g4!? is very similar to the game but without Bg5 and ...Rc8 thrown in. It is doubtful that this difference should help White.


31...Rc8 32.g4 hxg4 33.Bf6!?




An incredible concept. White could keep a very promising position with no risk by the simple 33.hxg4. On the other hand, it is very tricky, ultimately quite good for White, and extremely difficult to meet with as little time on the clock as Nigel had. **33...gxh3 (119)** **34.Qg4.** Nigel had one minute left, **34...Ra8! (118)**

Kasparov has two minutes left. One trick was that if Black plays 34...Bg7 here, White can continue with 35.Re7! Bxf6 (35...Qb8 36.Rxf7! wins, as does 35...Qd8 36.Rxf7!!) 36.Rxe7 Rxe7, and Black will have a lot of trouble holding this endgame because the queen is very strong at hunting loose pawns like all the ones that Black has, in spite of the “numerical equality” Black has in a bishop, rook, and pawn for the queen.


35.Qxh3 Bg7.



36. Bxg7? Gary was afraid to play 36.Re7!, but it seems that this move was correct. It forces 36...Qc8, as other queen moves lose to 37.Rxf7!, but then after 37.Qxc8+ Rxc8 38.Bxg7 Kxg7 39.Rd7 White enters a rook endgame which he may well be winning, because although he is down a pawn the far advanced d-pawn is stronger than all the rest. This was the logical conclusion of Kasparov's incredible 33rd move, and would have made the game much more interesting on a chess level. **36...Kxg7 37.Rh4 Rg8! 38.Rh7+ Kf8 39.Qg4. 39.Qe6!?** might have been better. **39...Ke8.**



At this point the monitors showed the arbiters approach the table and they conferred with the players. Kasparov won on time. Even at this late stage White could have held the draw by 40.Qe6+!, but of course this is a tragedy for Short, who defended very well in a difficult position, and after only one mistake by Kasparov, reached the better side of a drawn endgame. Still, the match has only just begun, and Short can draw confidence from two things: he tends to lose the first game of a match, even when he wins the match, and he was definitely "in this game to the end" with Kasparov.

<p>PRESS ROOM</p>  <p>The Times World Chess Championship</p>	<p>GAME 2</p> <p>9 September 1993 Short vs. Kasparov Sicilian Defence Richter–Rauzer Variation</p> <p>Commentator: Eric Schiller</p>
---	---

1.e4 c5 2.Nf3 d6 3.d4 cxd4 4.Nxd4 Nf6 5.Nc3 a6 6.Bg5. A slight surprise as most Grandmasters expected Short to play the English attack with 6.Be3. 6...Nc6. An ever bigger surprise as Kasparov normally adopts his favourite Najdorf variation. Perhaps he was worried about Short's preparation in the poisoned pawn variation. Now we have a rarely played line of the Richter-Rauzer variation. 7.Qd2 e6 8 .0-0-0 Bd7 9.f4 h6 10.Bh4 g5!?! The sharpest move at black's disposal. More normal is 9...b5.



**"The poisoned pawn variation has not been 'refuted'. Why didn't Kasparov play the Najdorf?"
—Hebden.**

11.fxg5 Ng4 12.Nf3. (Short has used 19 minutes to Kasparov's 6) There are only three games in the database with this move. It seems that 12.Be2 is the more normal move. The consensus, however, is that we have departed from well analysed paths.

"Short has been taken by surprise and so decided to avoid the more critical theoretical test of this variation with 12.Nxc6 and 13.g3." —Wolff..

12...hxf5. Given an exclamation mark in ECO, though considered a normal move.
13.Bg3. Not 13.Bg5 because of 13...f6 and when the bishop retreats, then the Black pawn will advance to e5 with decisive effect. **13...Be7.** Once again it was time for Nigel to think.
14.Be2 Nge5. Most Grandmasters liked the look of Black's control of the central squares. Even weaker players can appreciate the dominating position of the knight at e5. **15. Kb1.** (Short has used 44 minutes) The only reference in ECO (1989) is 15.Rhf1 Qa5 16.Kb1 f6 given as unclear by Banas. The game Adams-Lutz, Munich 1993 ran along similar lines though via a different move order.

"The game has now reached an interesting position which has always been dismissed as being better for White, but which in fact has simply not been played often enough for us to know the true evaluation of." —Wolff.




"I think the position suits Short" —Mortazavi.

"I think that it is probably = + though white has quite good winning chances" —Speelman.

For the first time, Kasparov plunged into thought, and his lead on the clock disappeared.

"Many Grandmasters are wondering why Kasparov is taking so long. "After all it must have been part of his preparation" —Wolff.

15...b5. This logical move has replaced 15...f6?!



16.Rdf1. Evidently an innovation, played after just two minutes contemplation. Tischbierek vs. Van der Wiel, Baden Baden 1992 went 16.Bd3 Rc8 17.Rdf1 Qa5 18.Be1 Nxd3 19.Qxd3 and Black is fine though Wolff claims that White has mishandled the position. 16...Rc8. Each player has used 49 minutes, par for the course, handling the clock better than in game one. But now Short returned to his meditative mood, and slid past the one hour mark as Kasparov rested away from the board.

"Garry has never let prospect of getting mated get in the way of active play for his pieces, but now his king will never castle. Whatever else happens, Nigel will have chances to win because of Black's weak king." —Wolff.

"Black's king really is very weak, isn't it?" —Speelman, after looking at the position for a couple of minutes..

16.Nd1 with the idea of Ne3, Nxe5 with the idea of knocking out the e5 stranglehold. — Hebden.

16.Nd1 Rh7 —Miles. 17.Ne3 Nxf3 18.gxf3! with the idea of a quick h4 followed by f4.


17.Nxe5. Short used almost 20 minutes for this move, which was unconsidered by virtually every Grandmaster in the analysis room.

" I don't like Nxe5, what is the hurry? " —Short.

"This is not a complete daydream for Black; it can go wrong."


"Premature" —Hebden.

17...Nxe5 18.Rf2. Kasparov (1.14) now overtakes Short (1.08) on the clock.



**"The more we look at it, the more we like White. Has anyone tried castling for Black!!"
—Plaskett.**

18...f6. 18...Rh7!? 19.Rhf1 Kf8 20.h4 gxh4? 21.Bxe5 dxe5 22.Rxf7+! Rxf7 23.Qh6+ Kg8 24.Rxf7! Kxf7 25.Bh5+ Kg8 26.Bg6 winning for White (Wolff, Hennigan, Mortazavi). **19.Rhf1.** Virtually every player in the room picked up the h-pawn to play 19.h4 Nc4 20.Bxc4 Rxc4 21.Rff1! Qb6 22.hxg5 Rxh1 23.Rxh1 fxg5 and White is winning. Short has used 1:19, Kasparov 1:15. **19...Bc6 20.a3.** The players are drifting toward time trouble again, as they are down to two minutes per move, having approximately forty minutes each to reach move forty. Now on 20...Qc7 21.Rf6 Bxf6 22.Rxf6 Qe7 23.Qxg5 Rf8 24.Bxe5 dxe5 25.Rxf8+ Kxf8 26.Qxe5 and White is doing very well.



20...Bb7. Kasparov has less than a half hour left. The consensus at this stage was that it was very hard to find a good move for Black in this position. 20...Rb8 21.Qd1 [Hebden] with the idea of 21...b4 22.axb4 Rxb4 23.Bh5+ Kd7 24.Bxe5 fxe5 25.Bg4 (with the idea of Bxe6+ and Qg4). At this stage Kasparov fell behind on the clock and looked ill at ease.


21.h3. Played very quickly.

"Excellent move by Nigel" —Wolff.

Now that the black bishop cannot immediately defend the h3-c8 diagonal, white wants to play a timely Bg4. 21.Qd1 looked very interesting, intending Bg4. [Plaskett and Schiller] The idea is to play Bh5 check and then take on e5. [Plaskett].

21...Nc4. Short has 36 minutes left, Kasparov has 24. **22.Bxc4 Rxc4 23.Qd3.** The last few moves were played quickly. **23..e5.** As predicted by GM Hebden though no one took him seriously at the time. The game is now similar to Game 1 with the difference that it is Kasparov that has the 'bad bishop'. **24.Re2.**

"The only that Garry has going for him in this position is that he is a better player" —Wolff.



24...Qc8. (104) Kasparov has 16 minutes left.

"I think Kasparov is better. The idea is to play Rxc3." —Norwood.


25.Rf5.

"He understands these positions extremely well" Petursson.


25...Rxc3. Impatience or the only move? the ending 27.Qxc3 Qxc3 28.bxc3 and black will play his king to the all important e6 square with compensation for the exchange. Hebden claimed on Television at this stage that Kasparov was winning!.

"One of the least surprising exchange sacrifices of Kasparov's career. Even in an endgame one rook would be tied down to the defence of the e-pawn" —Schiller.

Still, he only has seven minutes left. 26.bxc3. and Short is down to his last ten.



26...Qe6 27.Kb2 (111) Kd7 (113). Now if 27...d5, then 30.Rd1! is strong, and this is one of the motivations for the subsequent retreat of the rook to f1. 28.Rf1 Qc4!? A very strange move, according to Hebden. 29.Qxc4 bxc4 30.Ka2 (113) Bc6. (115). Short has 7 minutes, Kasparov 5. 31.Rb1 Bd8 32.Rb8 Re8 33.Bf2. In the analysis room, 33.h4 was also being discussed during the time scramble. 33...Ba5 34.Rxe8 Kxe8 35.Kb2 Kf7 36.Ba7. Three minutes left for each player. 36...Ke6 37.g4 Bd8 38.Kc1 Be7 39.Re3 d5 40.exd5 Kxd5. Time control has been cleared. 41.Kb2 Ke6 42.Bb6 Bd6 43.h4 gxh4 44.Rh3 e4 45.Rxh4 Bf4 46.Rh3 Bg5.



"Now the White rook, relieved from the burden of defending a weak e-pawn, is stuck with the potential problem of guarding the weak sibling at g4." —Schiller.

47 Bd4. Black still has some compensation for the pawn.

